China’s ‘New-Type’ Private Think Tanks: Is ‘New’ Better?

China’s public policy research community has long been dominated by large state-run research institutes, but in recent years financially and bureaucratically independent think tanks have played a more prominent role. While private think tanks have used a variety of strategies to secure funding and access to officials, a major constraint is the continuing influence of their state-run counterparts. What are the conditions under which private institutes can prosper in this environment, both in terms of providing meaningful advice and developing prestigious brands? This essay theorizes that these goals can be achieved under three conditions: when human capital is leveraged to provide new advice, when networks are deployed to build bridges between scholarly communities, and when effective use of information technology supports the dissemination of research outputs. An organization’s ability to meet those criteria depends both on resource endowments and on willingness to buck the conventional wisdom.

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Notes

The Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, based at Renmin University, was funded from a $32 million gift from Qiu Guogen, chairman of private equity firm Shanghai Chongyang Investment Co. Ltd. Tsinghua’s National Strategy Institute was funded with a gift of around $38 milion from Tianda Group Ltd. CEO Fang Wenquan. See the websites of Chongyang and Tianda, respectively: http://en.rdcy.org/more.php?cid=799, http://www.tianda.com/html/responsibility_inpage.php?id=129012. By contrast, CSIS lists its endowment at $30 Million. See: https://www.csis.org/support-csis/named-giving-opportunities.

See, for example, special sections on think tanks in the May 2018 edition of China: An International Journal and the fall 2019 edition of the China Policy Journal.

For instance, unlike their U.S. counterparts, Chinese think tanks are under no obligation to disclose salary of key officers, budgets, or key funders.

For instance, several high-profile IR scholars became members of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Foreign Policy Advisory Council, which was created in 2004 [10].

For a regional perspective, see also Pacific Affairs’ March 2018 special section on think tanks in China, Taiwan, and Japan.

These included the Beijing Pacific Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Shanghai Center for Rim of the Pacific Strategic and International Studies (both now defunct), and the Shanghai Institute for American Studies, which continues to operate [17].

For instance, a 2012 survey by scholars at the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics found 200 PTTs out of 2400 (8.3%); Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management identified 100 PTTs out of 2000 (5%); Nanjing University’s China Think Tank Index lists 36 “social” think tanks out of 602 (6%). See, respectively: [13, 30], and the Nanjing University China Think Tank Index, https://ctti.nju.edu.cn/CTTI/index.do.

Interviews. Hukou (household registration) is a precondition for access to public welfare benefits, such as medical care and school attendance [30].

For instance, one China Center for International Economic Exchanges official said that his organization had “outperformed rivals” because of access to senior officials, who “can participate in meetings of the State Council” [32].

Specifically, think tanks led by Ph.D. graduates were more influential than those that were not. Zhu also found that other graduate education and foreign study was useful by broadening think tank leaders’ social networks, thus giving them better access and influence.

Pishi are comments inserted on the margins of reports by officials. One interlocutor reports that scholars in his institute can receive a reward of around $10,000 for reports that receive pishi from Politburo-level officials. For university-based scholars, pishi can result in promotion or tenure.

He Yafei serves as co-chairman of the Center for China and Globalization’s Strategic Advisory Board and senior advisor to Pangoal’s Advisory Committee.

While not involving a private think tank, an example of this type of process concerns Xi Jinping’s request for analyses of U.S.-China military relations from CICIR and Fudan University around 2013. This suggested that Xi was either unsatisfied with the advice he was receiving from the PLA, or sought input to validate his desire to improve military relations with Washington [24].

For instance, Chongyang hired British economic adviser John Ross as a senior fellow in June 2013, while in November 2015 former U.S. Naval War College professor Thomas Barnett became a senior research fellow with Knowfar. See, respectively: [13] and website of Thomas P.M. Barnett, http://thomaspmbarnett.com/globlogization/2015/11/2/accepting-the-position-of-senior-research-fellow-knowfar-ins.html. Barnett concluded his tenure with Knowfar in 2018. See: http://thomaspmbarnett.com/globlogization/2018/10/22/concluding-my-stint-with-knowfar-institute.html

Interviews. Partly because of this effort, Han was awarded the prestigious Diplomatic Contribution Medal by the South Korean government in February 2018, a rare award for a Chinese citizen. The South Korean government’s statement emphasized that Han made important contributions to Sino-South Korea relations, especially during the cold days of the relationship. See [22].

For instance, in one randomly-selected week in 2018, Center for China and Globalization research or scholars were mentioned in seven news reports, including in Xinhua, China Daily, and the South China Morning Post. Center for China and Globalization website, http://www.ccg.org.cn/Effect/Index.aspx?ClassId=38.

Although CASS as a whole was ranked #2, many CASS institutes were ranked relatively low, such as the Institute of Finance (#85) and Institute of Rural Development (#89). Surprisingly, CICIR did not rank among the top 100. Ibid, 32–8.

Examples include Charhar’s Han Fangming, who serves on the CPPCC and CCG’s Wang Huiyao, who is vice chairman of the Western Returned Students Association, which is registered under the CCP’s United Front Work Department. Wang’s UFWD status gained attention in May 2018 when a Foreign Policy article suggested that he should be treated more as a CCP mouthpiece than an independent scholar [2]. Some scholars have also become regular pundits, which both entertains viewers and serves as a “release valve” for nationalistic sentiment [4].

For similar reasons, Pascal Abb argues that PTTs such as the Charhar Institute can be effective in delivering government messages to foreign audience [1].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

1. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington DC, 20024, USA Joel Wuthnow
2. Jinan University, Guangzhou, China Dingding Chen

1. Joel Wuthnow